The current studies investigated the processing and storage of lexical metaphors and metonyms by combining two existing methodologies from ambiguity research: counting the number of senses (as in e.g., Rodd, Gaskell, & MarslenWilson, 2002) and determining the relationship between those senses (as in e.g., Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007) . We have called these two types of ambiguity 'numerical polysemy' and 'relational polysemy' . Studies employing a lexical decision task (Experiment 1) and semantic categorization task (Experiment 2) compared processing of metaphorical and non-metaphorical words while controlling for number of senses. The effects of relational polysemy were investigated in more detail with a further lexical decision study (Experiment 3). Results showed a metaphor advantage and metonymy disadvantage which conflict with earlier findings of reverse patterns (e.g., Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007) . The fact that both conventional lexical metaphors and metonyms can incur either processing advantages or disadvantages strongly suggests they are not inherently stored differently in the mental lexicon.
(e.g., Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) . Interestingly, as far as we know it has not yet been investigated whether metaphors and metonyms (here sometimes collectively called 'figures of speech' for ease of reference) turn into regular ambiguous words once lexicalized, or whether they remain stored or processed differently from other ambiguous words. This may seem surprising, since researchers of ambiguity and figures of speech tend to employ similar methodologies to ask similar questions. However, they often do not use the same definitions, making comparisons far from straightforward. It would therefore be constructive to connect the research fields of figures of speech and other types of lexical ambiguity by comparing those definitions in an experimental setting. The current studies provide a first step in that direction by treating metaphors and metonyms as ambiguous words (as in Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007;  for other examples, see Klepousniotou, 2002; Klepousniotou et al., 2012; Klepousniotou et al., 2008) , while controlling for variables deemed important by researchers who investigated ambiguity without focusing on figures of speech (as in Rodd, Gaskell, & MarslenWilson, 2002 ; for other examples, see Beretta, Fiorentino, & Poeppel, 2005; Jager & Cleland, in press; Tamminen, Cleland, Quinlan, & Gaskell, 2006) .
Both Rodd et al. (2002) and Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) found support for a polysemy advantage: their polysemous words (words with related senses, e.g., hook) were recognized faster than homonyms (words with unrelated meanings, e.g., bank) or unambiguous control words. However, whereas Rodd et al. investigated prosaic language and defined ambiguity by counting the number of interpretations, Klepousniotou and Baum focused on figures of speech and determined the relationship between interpretations to define their ambiguity conditions. The first effect will be called 'numerical polysemy' , the second 'relational polysemy' . This terminology does justice to the fact that both Rodd et al. and Klepousniotou and Baum felt they were investigating polysemy, while highlighting their different approaches. Although not mutually exclusive, so far these approaches have not been applied simultaneously: those who defined polysemy by counting senses did not determine the relationship between the senses, while those who did specify the type of relationship between the senses did not control for number of senses.
Whereas Rodd et al. (2002) defined numerical polysemy by counting the number of sense entries in the online Wordsmyth Dictionary-Thesaurus (Parks, Ray, & Bland, 1998) , Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) investigated relational polysemy by testing recognition of metaphors and metonyms. They distinguished metaphors and metonyms by focusing on what they call regularity. The relationship between senses of the metonym chicken ('animal' and 'animal product' ) is considered to be regular: the two concepts are strongly related to each other, and using the same word for an animal and a product derived from it is a predictable pattern. In contrast, the relationship between senses of the metaphorical word shark ('animal' and ' ruthless person' ) is considered to be irregular: even though the metaphor is driven by perceived similarities between ruthless people and sharks, the two concepts themselves are not predictably related. It is important to note that there can be regularly-occurring rules for metaphorical relationships (e.g., animal-as-person metaphors are very common in English), however the relationship between the two concepts themselves tends to be irregular (i.e., they are not closely related). In both an auditory and a visual lexical decision study, metonyms (chicken) were recognized faster than homonyms (bat). Metaphors (shark) were sometimes recognized faster than homonyms and slower than metonyms.
According to Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) , the relationship between metaphorical senses is more regular (more closely related) than the one between homonymous meanings, but less so than the relation between metonymical senses. In a later publication, Klepousniotou et al. (2008) explained similar patterns on the basis of semantic overlap. Metonymical senses are thought to share many semantic properties, while homonymous meanings do not share any at all. Metaphorical senses share some characteristics, but fewer than metonyms. In both accounts (Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007; Klepousniotou et al., 2008) , metonyms are predicted to be processed faster than homonyms, whereas metaphors fall in between.
Two issues remain unaddressed in either of the relational polysemy accounts. Firstly, it is not clear where literal non-homonyms are situated on the polysemyhomonymy scale. In the experiments by Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) both metonyms and metaphors were recognized faster than literal controls, even though the senses for literal words can be related quite strongly as well. Some of these relationships, such as those between different syntactic senses (compare the noun sense of shade, 'absence of light' with the verb sense 'to block light') or shades of meaning (compare halloween mask and gas mask) may arguably be even more regular than those between metonymical senses. Therefore, if fast processing of metonyms is due to their highly regular senses, than the same should be true for many literal words. Secondly, the Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) stimuli were not matched for number of senses. As such, their polysemy advantage may have been due to a higher number of senses, or a higher number of words with many senses.
The current studies were conducted to investigate these two issues. In addition, they provide the first explicit investigation into the similarities and differences between figures of speech and other types of lexical ambiguity by combining the approaches used by Rodd et al. (2002) and Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) . In the current stimulus sets words were classified according to the relationship between their senses (as in e.g., Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007) while controlling for their number of senses (as in e.g., Rodd et al., 2002 ). Thus we tested the effect of relational polysemy while controlling for numerical polysemy. In Experiment 1, lexical decision times to words with metaphorical senses were compared to those for words without metaphorical senses. In Experiment 2, the same words were used in a semantic categorization task to investigate whether relational polysemy effects would reverse or disappear when more semantic processing was required, as was found for other ambiguity effects (e.g., Hino, Pexman, & Lupker, 2006) . Experiment 3, finally, investigated the difference between four types of words in more detail: literal, metaphorical, and metonymical non-homonyms, as well as literal homonyms.
Experiment 1: Relational Polysemy Effects with Lexical Decision
Experiment 1 compared metaphors and non-metaphors. Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) hypothesized that metaphors fall in between metonyms and homonyms because metaphorical senses are not as regularly (closely) related as metonymical senses, but more regular than homonymous meanings. Unfortunately, literal non-homonymous words were not assigned a place on this polysemyhomonymy scale. Although Klepousniotou and Baum were not surprised when metaphors were recognized faster than literal control stimuli, these findings are difficult to align with their own explanation for the metonymy advantage. As outlined earlier, many literal senses tend be closely related as well. If fast recognition of metonyms is due to their regular senses, then the same should be true for many literal words. Therefore, when comparing metaphorical words to sense-matched non-metaphors (i.e., literal and metonymical non-homonyms), the relational account should predict a metaphor disadvantage. If no significant difference between the two conditions was found, this would support the numerical explanation of the polysemy advantage: the difference in number of senses was very small between the two conditions, and should not result in a noticeable effect. A significant metaphor advantage could either indicate that the small difference in number of senses was sufficient to result in a numerical polysemy advantage after all, or that these metaphorical senses were more strongly related than had been assumed by Klepousniotou and Baum.
Method
Participants. In return for course credit, 30 undergraduate students of the University of Aberdeen (25 women) participated in this study. Their mean age was 20, ranging from 17 to 25. They were all native speakers of English, and none of them reported reading or speech difficulties.
Stimuli. The target words consisted of two sets of 30 words. One set contained the names of animals that had a metaphorical sense. This metaphorical relation was also employed by Klepousniotou and colleagues (e.g., Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007) . Only words for which a metaphorical sense was provided in the Wordsmyth Dictionary Thesaurus (Parks et al., 1998) were included in that condition. The other set contained the names of animals that did not have any metaphorical senses. They comprised a mix of metonyms and literal non-homonyms. Number of senses was significantly higher for the metaphors than the non-metaphors, t(58) = 3.95, p < .001. However, both means fell comfortably within the same 'few senses' range as employed in Rodd et al. (2002) , where mean sense counts for words with few senses ranged from 2.83 (Experiment 1) to 5.43 (Experiment 3). Furthermore, the difference between our two conditions was similar to those same minimum and maximum values for that condition: 2.2 senses for the nonmetaphors (ranging from 1 to 10) compared to 4.13 senses for the metaphors (ranging from 2-11). Most words in either condition would be assigned to the few senses condition if they had been used in a different study. Furthermore, number of senses was included in the over-item analyses. Thus, its role in potential findings would be clarified.
The two sets of words were matched on lemma frequency (raw and log-transformed), bigram frequency, number of neighbours (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Van Rijn, 1993) , familiarity ratings (Coltheart, 1981) , number of letters, and number of syllables (all ps ≥ .288). Concreteness scores (Coltheart, 1981) were not listed for two of the words (ostrich and octopus,), but t-tests showed that conditions were significantly matched (ps ≥ .522) irrespective of whether concreteness values for these two words were set to the highest or lowest concreteness score present in the stimulus set. The words and their properties have been listed in Appendix A.
In addition to the target words, the stimulus set also consisted of 182 fillers words and 242 nonwords. The filler words were a mix of low-and high-frequency words without any particular syntactic or semantic theme. The nonwords were obtained by replacing one letter in existing words.
Procedure. Participants were presented with strings of letters, and instructed to indicate by means of a button box whether they saw a real word or a nonword. On each trial, a fixation cross appeared for 500 ms. The fixation point was followed by presentation of the letter string (Courier New, 28 points). The trial ended when the participant had responded or 3000 ms after presentation of the word. Following the end of the trial, the screen remained blank for 1000 ms before presentation of the next fixation cross. Order of presentation was randomized for each participant. Prior to the experimental session, participants performed 30 practice trials (15 words, 15 nonwords) for which they received speed and accuracy feedback.
Results and Discussion
Participants' error rate ranged from 2 to 17%, with an average of 6.56%. Incorrect responses were not included for reaction time analyses. After reaction time outliers were excluded as well (±2SD from each participant's mean per condition; 5.53% of correct trials), participants' average reaction time was 557 ms, ranging from 403 to 678 ms. For both reaction times and error rates, a paired-samples t-test was performed over participants, whereas the over-item analyses consisted of univariate between-subjects ANCOVAs. All analyses contained one factor: 'polysemy type' . The manipulation was whether words had metaphorical senses or not. Effects of polysemy tend to be relatively small compared to those of e.g., frequency, so we took two steps to increase power of the analyses. Firstly, reaction times were log-transformed for all analyses to reduce response variability (as recommended by Baayen, 2008) . For ease of reading, the values are reported untransformed in text and tables. Secondly, as in Rodd et al. (2002) , the matched criteria were included as covariates in over-item ANCOVAs; not to exclude them as alternative explanations (although this was true to some extent for number of senses), but again to reduce the effect of response variability.
Covariates were only included in the final analyses if they significantly contributed to variance (ps < .05). For reaction time analyses, frequency and familiarity were added as covariates in this way. Error rate analyses only included number of neighbours. A summary of the results can be seen in Table 1 . Reaction times differed significantly between relatedness conditions over participants and marginally over stimuli (t(29) = 8.54, p = .007, F(1, 56) = 3.60, p = .063, η² = .06). Metaphorical words were recognized 18 ms faster than non-metaphorical words. The effect on error rates reached significance over both participants and stimuli (t(29) = 23.49, p < .001, F(1, 57) = 4.75, p = .033, η² = .08). Mean error rate was more than twice as high for metaphors as for non-metaphorical words. A metaphor advantage was found for both reaction times and error rates. On the one hand, this effect cannot be explained on the basis of earlier findings for numerical polysemy (e.g., Rodd et al., 2002) : number of senses did not contribute significantly to either reaction time or error rate variability (p ≥ .666). Thus the metaphor advantage in the current study could not be due to a numerical polysemy effect. On the other hand, the effects go into the opposite direction as the metaphor disadvantage predicted on the basis of the relational account (e.g., Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007) .The results suggest that the metaphorical senses were more closely (regularly) related in the current word set than those of the non-metaphorical words. If the current effect was indeed due to relational polysemy, it would be interesting to see whether the effect would reverse into a disadvantage or disappear with semantic processing, as was previously found for polysemy effects. For example, Hino et al. (2006) found that words with many strongly-related senses (polysemous words) showed a processing advantage with lexical decision whereas words with several weakly-related meanings (homonyms) did not. In contrast, homonyms but not polysemous words showed a significant processing disadvantage with semantic categorization.
To address their findings regarding meaning-relatedness, Hino et al. (2006) turned to the PDP model by Rodd, Gaskell, and Marslen-Wilson (2004) . That model is consistent with their lexical decision findings for polysemous stimuli: it assumes that a high number of polysemous senses results in a single broad but shallow activation pattern which is easily excited thus facilitating word recognition. However, Hino et al. point out that the predictions of the Rodd et al. model do not match all of their findings. It implements unrelated meanings of homonyms as separate, deep attractor basins. The system will first reach a blend stage, which will then have to be escaped even if meaning processing is not strictly required for the task. The difficulty of this escape causes a homonymy disadvantage with lexical decision. However, homonymy did not affect lexical decision in the Hino et al. study; they only found a homonymy disadvantage for semantic processing. Similarly, Hino et al. found that semantic categorization was unaffected by polysemy, whereas Rodd et al. predict a polysemy disadvantage for semantic categorization because the broad shallow activation patterns would decrease the speed with which the model can settle in a stable semantic pattern. A newer PDP model by Armstrong and Plaut (2008) showed patterns which were more in line with the Hino et al. findings: a polysemy advantage for lexical decision and a homonymy disadvantage with semantic categorization.
Taken together, these findings and models do not yet provide a unified account of the effects of polysemy on semantic processing. Rodd et al. (2004) predict that polysemy should result in slower semantic categorization latencies, whereas the Hino et al. findings (2006) and the Armstrong and Plaut model (2008) suggest that polysemy does not affect semantic processing at all. Experiment 2 was conducted to test the effects of semantic categorization on the processing of our current polysemous stimuli.
Findings of a metaphor disadvantage would support the Rodd et al. model (2004) , whereas disappearance of the effects would be in line with the Hino et al. findings (2006) and the Armstrong and Plaut model (2008) . In both these cases, the current manipulation of relational polysemy would result in similar patterns as previously predicted or found for numerical polysemy. Finally, persistence of the metaphor advantage could either be a sign that the metaphor advantage in Experiment 1 was not a polysemy effect but had a different cause, or that relational polysemy affects processing differently than numerical polysemy does.
Experiment 2: Relational Polysemy Effects with Semantic Processing

Method
Participants. Thirty undergraduate students of the University of Aberdeen (17 female) took part in this experiment in return for course credit. Their mean age was 22.5 (range: 18-31). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were native speakers of English.
Stimuli. The 60 target animal words were identical to those described for Experiment 1. Because the current study required participants to indicate whether each item was an object or an animal, nonwords were not needed, and only 290 filler words were added. In total, participants saw 175 object words and 175 animal words.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1, except that participants performed a semantic categorization task by pressing an 'object' button or 'animal' button. Response hand was counterbalanced over participants. The experimental session consisted of 350 trials, and was preceded by a practice session of 10 trials.
Results and Discussion
Participants' error rate ranged from 0 to 18%, with an average of 4.95%. Incorrect responses were not included for reaction time analyses. After reaction time outliers were excluded as well (±2SD from each participant's mean per condition; 4.85% of correct trials), participants' average reaction time was 535 ms, ranging from 408 to 688 ms. Analyses were as described for Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, one factor was included for all analyses: 'polysemy type' . Again, comparisons were between metaphorical and non-metaphorical words. None of the seven potential covariates were included in the reaction time ANCOVA (all ps > .05). Concreteness was a covariate for the error rate ANCOVA. A summary of the results can be seen in Table 2 . Metaphorical words were recognized only a non-significant 2 ms faster than non-metaphorical words (t(29) = −0.35, p = .727, F(1, 58) = 0.90, p = .765, η² < .01), and error rates were also very similar for the two conditions (t(29) = 0.52, p = .610, F(1, 57) = 0.28, p = .600, η² < .01). The metaphor advantage that was found in the lexical decision task in Experiment 1 completely disappeared when the words had to be processed for meaning in Experiment 2. These findings are similar to those found by Hino et al. (2006) , whose polysemous stimuli also showed a processing advantage with lexical decision but no effect on semantic processing. Thus, relational polysemy could be explained on the basis of the Armstrong and Plaut model (2008) , which achieved similar patterns by modelling polysemy as separate but partly overlapping sense representations (indicative of common derivations). On average, the same stimuli tended to be recognized faster and more accurately in the semantic task (535 ms and 4.95%) than they were in the lexical task (557 ms and 6.56%). Although nothing definite can be concluded from this comparison, these faster reaction times do seem to argue against an explanation in terms of processing level: higher processing demands should not result in faster responses. However, animal words are not usually common in everyday-language, and it is conceivable that the semantic task provided priming of animal words in general. It is not possible to ascertain from the current findings whether the metaphor advantage found in Experiment 1 was a relational polysemy advantage that disappeared in Experiment 2 because of the different task demands, or whether the lack of an effect in the semantic task should be taken as an indication that the original effect was caused by some other factor. However, a potential hint is provided by the fact that especially the non-metaphorical words seemed affected by task type: they were recognized 32 ms faster in the semantic categorization task than with lexical decision. For metaphors, this difference was 12 ms. If the effect in the lexical task was due to a metaphor advantage, performance for the metaphorical rather than the non-metaphorical words should have been affected by semantic processing. Therefore, the second option seems more likely: the findings in Experiment 1 may not have been a metaphor advantage after all. To investigate in more detail whether slow responses for non-metaphors were mostly due to the metonyms (salmon) or the literal non-homonymous words (panda), a new stimulus set was developed for which the three types of relational polysemy were separated. In addition, homonymy was investigated as well.
If both metonyms and metaphors are recognized faster than literal non-homonyms, this finding would replicate those by Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) and would support their hypothesis that relational polysemy can facilitate word processing. In contrast, the metaphor advantage in Experiments 1 may have been due to a processing disadvantage of metonyms and/or literal non-homonyms.
Experiment 3: A Further Exploration of Relational Polysemy Effects
Method
Participants and procedure. Thirty undergraduate students at the University of Aberdeen (21 female) participated in return for course credit. Participants' age ranged from 17 to 30 (mean age was 20). All participants had English as their native language, and reported no speech, hearing, or visual disorders. The procedure was identical to the one described for Experiment 1. Prior to the experimental session, participants performed 30 practice trials (15 words, 15 nonwords) for which they received speed and accuracy feedback.
Stimuli. The current experiment compared metaphorical and metonymical words to literal non-homonyms and literal homonyms. Again, animal words were used as stimuli. To fully exclude the numerical polysemy effect as alternative explanation, number of senses (Parks et al., 1998) was matched even more closely between the polysemy conditions, with means of 2.36, 2.57, and 2.43 senses for literal, metaphorical, and metonymical non-homonyms, respectively (p = .525). The stimuli can be found in Appendix B. The stimulus set consisted of 60 animal words (15 per condition). Some words employed in Experiments 1 and 2 were re-used for the current word set, with metaphors always reassigned as metaphors, and non-metaphors either assigned as literal non-homonyms or metonyms. Again, both the metonymical and metaphorical senses were derived by extension rules which are common in English. We developed these sets on the basis of two polysemous extensions of animal words: animal/person (metaphors) and animal/product (metonyms). Both types of extensions were employed in research by Klepousniotou and colleagues (e.g., Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007) . The metaphorical words (vulture) all had a metaphorical sense listed for them in the Wordsmyth Thesaurus-Dictionary (Parks et al., 1998) . For the metonyms procedure was not dictionary-based but still structured: they were included if the word could be used for an animal-derived product, be it food (anchovy) or material (mink).
Homonyms with two animal meanings could not be found, so these had one animal meaning and one non-animal meaning (bat).The literal non-homonyms (panda) did not have a metaphorical or metonymical sense. Most instances of 'literal' polysemy tend to be either noun-verb extensions (e.g. 'a hook' and 'to hook') or shades of meaning. In the case of shades of meaning, senses are related without one being more basic or central than the other(s). For example, there is a difference between a mask that mainly hides your identity (e.g., by a thief) and a mask that mostly allows someone to take on an identity (such as a halloween mask). Yet neither of these senses is perceived to be derived from the other (although historically they very well might be). In the current literal non-homonyms, there were some cases of noun-verb extensions, e.g., 'a turtle' and 'to turtle' (hunt for turtles). However, most of the sense distinctions were instantiations of shades of meaning, for example the European and American bison, or the giant and lesser panda. Additionally, the stimulus set contained 180 filler words and 240 nonwords. These were similar to those described for Experiment 1.
Due to the strict demands of target stimuli (all animals; number of senses and meanings, type of sense relationships), the use of words could not be restricted to those for which concreteness and familiarity ratings could be obtained from the MRC database (Coltheart, 1981) . Because all words referred to animals, it was assumed that they were highly concrete. Familiarity ratings were obtained by means of a computer-based questionnaire. The procedure for this familiarity questionnaire was based on Gilhooly and Logie (1980) and Noble (1953) . The words and their properties can be found in Appendix B.
In addition to number of senses, the three non-homonym conditions (literal, metaphorical, metonymical) were matched on lemma frequency (raw and log-transformed), bigram frequency, number of neighbours (Baayen et al., 1993) , familiarity (questionnaire), number of senses (Parks et al., 1998) , number of letters, and number of syllables, (all ps ≥ .282). Even though care was taken to match the homonyms as closely as possible to the other three conditions, it could not be avoided that homonyms differed significantly from the other conditions on almost all variables. However, it was ensured that these differences were as much as possible in a facilitating direction: most of them should result in faster reaction times. Thus, if a disadvantage such as in previous studies (e.g., Rodd et al., 2002) was found, it would probably not be due to one of these variables. However, just to be sure that the effects of interest would not be affected by the other variables, they were again inserted as covariates in the over-item analyses (this also again reduced noise in the data, thus increasing power of the analyses).
Results and Discussion
One word from the metonymy condition was recognized extremely poorly (ermine, with 83% of participants thinking that this was a nonword). It was removed from analysis, together with a matched word from each of the other conditions to keep the number of stimuli in each condition identical (marked with an asterisk in Appendix B). Matched words were selected in such a way that the seven lexical properties of the words (frequency, familiarity, etc) were still optimally matched for the three non-homonym conditions (all ps ≥ .245). Additionally, data of one participant were excluded because of high error rates (20%). Remaining participants' error rate ranged from 0 to 18%, with an average of 8.44%. Incorrect responses were not included for reaction time analyses. Once reaction time outliers were removed (±2SD from each participant's mean per condition; 5.78% of correct trials), participants' average reaction time was 553 ms, ranging from 447 to 650 ms. As in Experiments 1 and 2, reaction times were log-transformed to reduce variability and thus increase power. For both reaction times and error rate, a repeated-measures ANOVA was performed over participants, a univariate between-subjects ANCOVA over items. All analyses included one factor: 'ambiguity type' . This time, four conditions were compared: non-homonymous metaphors, metonyms, and literal words, as well as literal homonyms. Inclusion of covariates in the final analyses was based on the same criteria as in Experiments 1 and 2. For both reaction times and error rates, only familiarity was included in the final analyses (p < .05). Results have been summarized in Table 3 . The effect of relatedness condition on reaction times reached significance over participants and items (F 1 (3, 84) = 4.95, p = .003, η² = .15; F 2 (3, 51) = 3.12, p = .034, η² = .16). Planned comparisons for the over-participant effects (Bonferronicorrected) showed that metonymical words were recognized 33 ms slower than the literal non-homonyms, p = .011 and 23 ms slower than metaphors, p = .055. None of the other effects reached significance (all ps ≥ .184). Relatedness did not affect error rates (F 1 (3, 84) = 1.17, p = .327, η² = .04, F 2 (3, 51) = 1.02, p = .392, η² = .06).
The most noticeable effect in Experiment 3 was the large metonymy disadvantage. Metonyms were recognized significantly slower than the literal nonhomonyms, and marginally slower than the metaphors. Thus it seems likely that the metaphor advantage in Experiment 1 was not due to a difference between metaphors and literal non-homonyms, but between metonyms on the one hand and metaphorical words and literal non-homonyms on the other. In contrast to the results found by Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) , metonyms were also recognized slower than homonyms. The latter effect was only numerical, possibly because performance for the homonyms may have received a boost due to their poor matching (they were more frequent and more familiar than the other words, for example). That a relatively large numerical homonymy disadvantage was still found anyway provides some modest support for the homonymy disadvantage found in earlier studies (e.g., Rodd et al., 2002) . Again, the metonymy disadvantage could not have been due to numerical polysemy. The number of senses for the metonyms was closely matched to those for the metaphors and the literal nonhomonyms, and number of senses did not correlate significantly with reaction time or error rate when it was entered as a covariate in the ANCOVAs.
Furthermore, the metonymy disadvantage is also not likely to have been due to typicality issues. It is true that both the literal non-homonyms (hedgehog) and the metaphors (peacock) primarily referred to animals and not at all (literal nonhomonyms) or only secondarily (metaphors) to other objects. In contrast, for modern urbanites some metonyms (e.g., anchovy or haddock) may primarily refer to material or food derived from animals and only secondarily to those animals themselves. Fortunately, the majority of these metonyms were also included in the semantic task for Experiment 2, so this hypothesis could be put to the test. If the metonyms were recognized slower in the current experiment because they were less typical instances of animals, reaction times for these words should be slower for the semantic categorization task than for lexical decision. In fact, only one of the seven metonyms included in those experiments was not recognized faster with semantic categorization than with lexical decision, namely rabbit (hardly the word with the most dominant non-animal sense). The other six words (herring, leopard, lobster, mink, oyster, trout) were recognized 14 to 106 ms faster in the semantic task than in the lexical task. The fact that the greater emphasis on animal meanings/senses in Experiment 2 (animal or object?) than in Experiment 1 (word: yes/no?) facilitated responses to metonyms rather than delaying them strongly suggests that the current metonymy disadvantage was not due to these metonyms being less typically used to refer to animals than the metaphors and the literal non-homonymous words.
An explanation in terms of relational polysemy would mean that relations between these metonymical senses were less regular than those between the literal and metaphorical senses (Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007) or that their senses have less semantic overlap (Klepousniotou et al., 2008) . However, the direction of the effect runs counter to that predicted by either account. Both assumed that metonymical senses are inherently more regularly related or show stronger semantic overlap, and thus should always be recognized faster than literal nonhomonymous words and usually faster than metaphors. In fact, Klepousniotou and Baum defined metonyms and metaphors on the basis of these sense relatedness properties. However, the current findings strongly suggest that degree of relationship regularity or semantic overlap is not inherent in specific figures of speech (i.e., metonymy = regular sense relationship, metaphors = irregular sense relationship), and thus should not be used to define them. Both metonymical and metaphorical senses could be derived by means of regular or irregular rules and/ or have a small or large degree of semantic overlap.
General Discussion
The current studies experimentally connected the research fields of lexical ambiguity and figures of speech. This aim was pursued by combining two recent approaches towards investigating polysemy: investigating the effect of number of senses (e.g., Rodd et al., 2002) and researching different types of relationships between these senses (e.g., Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007) . Experiment 1 found that words with metaphorical senses were recognized faster and with fewer errors than words with literal and metonymical senses. In Experiment 2 participants processed the same stimuli for meaning, which caused the effect to disappear. Finally, Experiment 3 seems to have pinpointed at least the general cause of the metaphor advantage found in Experiments 1: they were probably due to a slow recognition of metonyms rather than a disadvantage for literal non-homonyms or an advantage for metaphors. None of these effects were due to numerical polysemy: number of senses did not affect responses. However, these results are in stark contrast to the findings of a metonymy advantage by Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) , so they do not support the relational polysemy accounts either.
One reason for the discrepancy could be that Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) did not control for number of senses, whereas the stimuli in the current studies were matched as closely as possible for that variable. Thus it seems possible that their effects were confounded by numerical polysemy. A second potential reason for the opposing metonymy effects in the current studies to those found by Klepousniotou and Baum could be that we focused on only one type of metonymy, namely words with an animal/product extension. Similarly, we also employed just one type of metaphors: words with an animal/person extension. In contrast, Klepousniotou and Baum employed several different types of metonyms and metaphors (including the same two employed in the current studies). Thus it might be that their hypothesis of an advantage for words with regular relationships between senses was correct, but that this property is not inherently present in all metonyms or absent in all metaphors. In that case, metaphors and metonyms cannot be distinguished on the basis of this regularity.
It seems conceivable that sense relatedness may have been very high for the current metaphors, with their highly-conventional animal-person sense relationships. Even though foxes and people themselves may not be closely associated, the lexicalized use of the word fox for cunning and sly people may have caused the relationship between these sense representations to strengthen over time. In contrast, the relationship between animals and the products derived from them may have been lost, and thus be less regular. For many modern urbanites the relationship between an animal and a product derived from this animal may not be closely associated anymore. A piece of chicken or beef in the supermarket may not evoke pictures of living (or worse, dead) animals. Thus, because these two senses of the word only co-occur in special circumstances (e.g., news of an animal disease endangering the food supply), it is possible that they have developed separate (competing) entries in the mental lexicon.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 were initially interpreted as replications of the Hino et al. (2006) findings, and thus as support for the Armstrong and Plaut (2008) model: a polysemy advantage with lexical decision, no effect of polysemy with semantic categorization. However, the results of Experiment 3 strongly suggest that the findings of Experiment 1 were not due to a metaphor advantage but a metonymy disadvantage. As explained above, this metonymy disadvantage implies that at least some metonyms (such as the current animal/product ones) may be stored more akin to homonyms rather than as polysemous words. In contrast, Hino et al. found that homonymy did not robustly affect lexical decision, whereas it resulted in a significant processing disadvantage with semantic categorization. The model by Armstrong and Plaut predicted the same pattern. Thus, neither the Hino et al. results nor the Armstrong and Plaut model can help explain the metonymy disadvantage that is probably responsible for the effects found for lexical decision in Experiment 1, nor their disappearance in the semantic categorization task of Experiment 2.
A more comprehensive account can be formulated by combining the theories of Klepousniotu and Baum (2007) and/or Klepousniotou et al. (2008) with the PDP ambiguity model that was developed by Rodd et al. (2004) . The patterns observed in the current studies could be incorporated in the Rodd et al. model by means of the theories posited by Klepousniotou and Baum and Klepousniotou et al.: as separate deep but narrow attractor basins for the irregularly derived or weakly overlapping interpretations, but one broad and narrow attractor basin for words with regularly-derived or strongly-overlapping readings. Conceptually, especially the degree-of-overlap approach would fit quite well: larger degree of overlap could conceivably result in larger attractor basins. In contrast, it would be more difficult to imagine that regular derivations should result in a broad but shallow attractor basin whereas irregular derivations form narrow and deep attractor basins. Importantly, in either case metaphors and metonyms would not inherently be stored in one way or the other in the mental lexicon, so the regularity of their representation could not be used to define them. For the current stimuli, the metonyms were less regular than the metaphors and the literal nonhomonyms, therefore incurred a processing disadvantage with lexical decision.
Although Rodd et al. predicted a polysemy disadvantage with semantic categorization (proposing that even related senses compete for activation once a particular interpretation is required), they did not provide a hypothesis for the effects of semantic processing on homonyms. However, the homonymy disadvantage for lexical processing was hypothesized to be due to the model entering a blend stage, which would have to be escaped even if semantic categorization was not necessary. If this blend stage is considered to be exceptional even when a specific interpretation is necessary, then the Rodd et al. model can be taken to suggest that homonyms also incur a processing disadvantage for semantic categorization. Alternatively, the blend stage may be conceived as a regular part of the interpretation process that all words go through with semantic categorization, but that only homonyms enter with lexical decision. In that case, homonyms and nonhomonyms would perform similarly with semantic categorization. If the blend stage is considered to be a default part of semantic categorization (but superfluous with lexical decision) then the Rodd et al. model can accommodate for the current findings of a metonymy disadvantage with lexical decision but not semantic categorization.
The current studies for the first time explicitly bridged the gap between the research fields of ambiguity and figures of speech by combining recent approaches of investigating polysemy: determining the effect of number of senses (e.g. Rodd et al., 2002) and the relationships between these senses (e.g. Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007) . This approach enabled us to compare our results to those found in both these studies, as well as come up with explanations in terms of both types of models. Thus, combining the approaches and models from the research fields of ambiguity and figures of speech has certainly proven a fruitful endeavour. bee, camel, deer, doe, eel, elephant, flea, hamster, hare, herring, horse, kitten, leopard, lizard, lobster, mare, mink, mosquito, moth, owl, oyster, puppy, rabbit, ram, robin, sparrow, spider, squirrel, trout, turtle ape, bird, bulldog, butterfly, canary, clam, fox, goat, gorilla, hog, hound, insect, lamb, lion, monkey, mouse, octopus, ostrich, pigeon, rat, reptile, shark, shrimp, snail, snake, tiger, toad, tortoise, wolf, worm 
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